establishing the Common Market contains antitrust provisions that will be vital in shaping the economic and competitive framework within which these six countries hope to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. While broad issues of history, political science, and economics underlie these objectives, 4 this article will concern itself only with the relatively narrow but central problem of the implementation of the Community's economic and political aims by the use of antitrust laws, and will endeavor to note some of the more significant consequences for American lawyers and businessmen of these relatively unexplored provisions. 5 Obviously, the merging of national markets in the Common Market offers many opportunities for the extension of restrictive economic practices. 6 While the abolition of import tariffs and quotas between the member nations can be a liberalizing factor in the production and distribution of goods, their removal could easily lead to the expansion of local cartels and other anticompetitive forces and structures to a multi-nation Community level. 7 With
AcTIVITIEs OF THE COMMUNITY 109 (21 March 1959 -15 May 1960 (March 25, 1957) . The official languages and texts are, of course, Dutch, French, German and Italian.
The best English text of articles 85-90 is that of Riesenfeld, in 2 STEIN & NIcHOLSoN 200-03. The authorized translation of the treaty is published by the Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom (1957) , and is reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 14-94 (1958) . Another translation appears in 51 Am. 3. INT'L L. 865 (1957) .
4. An indication of the amount of material already produced may be obtained from (Proehl ed. 1959) . 5. Aspects of this problem were among the subjects of a conference recently sponsored by the Federal Bar Association and other organizations, see [1960] INSTITUTE ON this in mind, and in a pattern surprisingly analogous to the experience of the United States, the treaty signatories favored some kind of antitrust legislation. 8 The antitrust provisions of the Rome Treaty are quite straightforward. Article 85 prohibits, with certain exceptions, 9 concerted practices and agreements, likely to affect trade between member states, the object or result of which is to restrict competition. Article 86 forbids without exception the abuse of dominant market position by entities. The general standard of anticompetitive effect used to establish violations in both articles are necessarily vague, and as in the United States, considerable administrative and judicial discretion must be employed to create a body of precedent.
Articles 87 and 88 govern the application of these standards, respectively, by calling for appropriate regulations on several obvious questions of procedure and administration, and by providing for the interim applicability of local law, to be used in consonance with articles 85 and 86, pending adoption of these regulations.
At the present stage of Common Market development two major problems under these antitrust provisions present themselves: first, the substantive content of these provisions, alone and in relation to the existence or lack of antitrust legislation in the member states; second, the proper procedure for effectuating these provisions, especially in relation to nonuniform national procedures.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF ARTICLES 85 AND 86
The superficial resemblance between Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act'° is immediately apparent. Both the treaty and the act separate restrictive practices engendered by the exercise of monopoly power from those created by concerted activities; more important, both are programmatic and require the slow accretion of case law to become helpful guideposts. Since the United States has already passed through a great part of this accretion phase, its antitrust case law will undoubtedly be of great interest to the European bar. In fact the LAW 118, 124 (1960) ; Stein, supra note 4, at 6; SPAAK REPORT.
Article 85(3)
. There is some question as to the significance of the phrase "null and void":
It is doubtful that the nullity of such arrangements is intended to be more than a presumption, as the appropriate authority may in each case grant exemption where it is established that the management will contribute to an improvement in production or distribution.
Haight, Antitrust Laws and the Territorial Principle, 11 VAND. L. REV. 27, 52 (1957) ;
.cf. O'Brien, supra note 8, at 132.
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) , as amended, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1958) .
[Vol. 61 : 402 number of references by commentators 1 and courts' 2 to our own antitrust laws is remarkable, especially in the preliminary determinations of "interstate commerce," "per se" rules of illegality as opposed to the rule of reason, and the percentages of market occupancy that indicate the existence of a monopoly.'
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The relevance of American experience is, of course, clear. The treaty concerns the economic position of six countries, but primarily as an entity. Thus it is less concerned with the play of restrictive forces entirely within a member state than between such states. To this extent, doctrines of "interstate commerce" must be developed, and a likely source is United States case law. 14 It would, however, be misleading to overemphasize this relationship. Antitrust concepts affect the economy, but they are also shaped and defined by it. 1 ' From this point of view, the Treaty and national legislation work on a different base than do the Sherman and Clayton Acts'A-namely, on the syndicate and association form of doing business, which is prevalent in Europe.' 7 European producers associate to export competitively vis-a-vis other countries' exporters, to set uniform discounts and rebates and sizes, and to set uniform conditions of sale and of transport; in short, one might say, in order to bring order. The procedure by which existing national antitrust legislation is enforced by some member states recognizes the resulting basic differences, for on the whole administrative agencies are utilized to examine such arrangements under legal standards probably as general as those of the Sherman Act.' 8 Thus we may anticipate that agreements and associations which would 11. Thus LANGEN, KOMMENTAR ZUm KARTELLGESETz, app. 11, 474 (1958) Caen, May 8-10, 1959. 18. This is the Dutch and French approach in practice. Cf. Linnssen, Massnahmen be struck down at once in the United States because of their "probable effect" would be challenged in the Community only if they in fact produce the undesired restrictive consequences, despite the terms of the Treaty that prohibit likely anticompetitive effects. The cartel authorities of the various member states, as they are created or expand their functions, will likely restrict themselves to taking care that agreements previously approved do not bring about actual restrictions of competition." 9 This difference is in part due to differing statutory standards, but in greater part reflects the differences in underlying economic practices.
A. Substantive Scope of Article 85
1. Restrictive trade practices prohibited by article 85. Article 85 forbids and nullifies agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices, that are likely to affect trade between member states and that intend or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Common Market. Since competition within a member state is competition "within the Common Market," a restrictive practice that is likely to affect "interstate" commerce may be prohibited even though designed to restrict competition solely within one country. Thus at one stroke the provision is made applicable to local agreements, if their effect is to render a local producer less able to trade with other member states.
20
gegen Kartelle in den Niederlanden, 9 WuW 428 (1959) ; Peters, Zur Nenordnung des franz6sichen Kartellrechts durch die Verordnung von 24. Juni 1958 , 9 WuW 439 (1959 ; see Thorelli, Antitrust in Europe: National Policies after 1945, 26 U. CHI. L. R. Ev. 222 (1959) . In Germany this approach is codified in § 9 of the Cartel Law as a means of testing the various types of agreements permitted by § § 2-8 as exceptions to the restrictive practices prohibited by § 1.
19. Thus in approving an application for an export cartel, the German Cartel Office customarily requires that all changes in the cartel's agreements and all decisions affecting the cartel's purposes be reported to it. For example, see the conditions in the approval of an export cartel for producers of blank steel, in Announcement No. 1/59, 16 Jan. 1959 , reported in 9 WuW 342 (1959 . See also Goldstein, in 1958 INsTITuTE 273. If the regulations proposed by the EEC Commission are adopted, national cartel authorities will have less importance, since most of the "interstate" restrictive practices will be subject to the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. Cf. Proposed Regulations, Article 1, 2, 5 and 6, in the appendix to this article.
20. It should be recognized that this position is in indirect conflict with the position of commentators on the 'interstate commerce' effect of monopolistic power in the Common Market. Thus Spengler argues that a monopolistic position "in the Common Market" under article 86 requires a position in more than one member state. Spengler, Abgrenzung zwischen Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen und EWG-Vertrag, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 968; Spengler, Abgrenzung swischen dcm GWB und den "Vorschriften filr Unternehinen" im EWG Vertrag, 8 WuW 73, 461 (1958) ; see Gfinther, Die Regehng des Wettbewerbs im Vertrag zur Gribidung der Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 7 WuW 275, 283 (1957) . Leaving aside for the moment consideration of this position as to the article 86 problem, there is nevertheless a difference in the market terminology used in the two articles; see the text accompanying notes 45 infra. But see Goldstein, in 1958 INsTrIruTE 239 n.100 . This argument may not prevail if the Commission's proposed regulations are adopted. Article 5(2) thereof limits enterprises' duty to notify the Commission of restrictive acts, as listed in article 5(1), to those involving enterprises located in different member states.
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ANTITRUST REGULATION IN THE EEC
Five types of practices, although not exclusive, are expressly condemned. Three are familiar Sherman Act transgressions: price fixing and the fixing of other "trading conditions"; controls on production, markets, technical development and investment; and division of markets and supply sources. One, interestingly enough, is the imposition of different conditions for various transactions involving similar goods that adversely affect competitors of the favored party, 2 ' the last cumbersomely emerges as the tie-in agreement.
Price fixing, whether by vertical or horizontal agreement of competitors, is unqualifiedly prohibited; there is no exception for fair-traded goods, which constitute a large part of the consumer product market in Europe. This prohibition is particularly striking when compared to the German Cartel Law, which forbids restrictive practices generally but permits fixing the prices of fair-traded goods. 22 Nor is an exception made for price fixing of patented goods sold by a licensee, which is another common feature of the European economy. 2 3 Again, the German Cartel Law, which forbids patent license agreements extending restrictions beyond the scope of the patent monopoly, 24 exempts restrictions on the price of the patented article. Limitations on production, on internal technological development, and the like, are declared null and void. 26 While such restrictions embodied in horizontal agreements between competitors would be clearly prohibited, the use of patent licenses to control production of patented goods or goods Kartellrecht der Europdischen Gemneinschaften, 10 WuW 250 (1960) . Nissen argues that the decisions of such associations ought not to fall within the scope of article 85 if they merelr set forth the expected competitive behavior of the association, an argument not likely to be adopted by the Commission. Id. at 252.
made by patented processes should be considered a permissible exception, since such restrictions are commonly understood to be within the monopoly grant of a patent. 27 However, other patent license arrangements that can not be said to fall within the patent grant, such as a provision limiting a licensee in his research efforts, or requiring the grantback of parallel or improvement licenses, may be void under this subsection.
The division of markets between competing producers is clearly prohibited. 28 However, the restriction of a patent licensee to a given territory within the area of the patent monopoly would in all likelihood be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the patent monopoly itself. Nevertheless it is questionable whether a patent license would be valid under article 85 if as a condition for permitting the licensee to exploit a territory within the patent's monopoly, the licensee was compelled to agree not to sell in other territory.
No decisions or discussions have yet explored the significance of the fourth type of restraint-the use of discriminatory conditions against parties to transactions that result in a competitive disadvantage. It seems clear, however, that the whole field of price and service discrimination is opened up by this clause. Thus, even if the stultifying complexity of Robinson-Patman 27. Admittedly this argument, based on American patent law and antitrust doctrines and the apparent acceptance of these doctrines in § 20 of the German Cartel Law, assumes a logically indefensible difference between requiring a patent licensee to produce only a limited percentage of his requirements of the patented product, and requiring him to maintain the resale price of a patented product.
Section 20(1) of the German Cartel Law also validates in general terms restrictions in licenses regarding territory, time of exploitation, type of article to be produced, and the like, which restrictions are considered within the scope of the patent monopoly. Thus these restrictions would probably be valid under the Treaty.
However, § 20(2) legitimatizes restrictions that are clearly beyond the grant of the patent monopoly and therefore would probably be invalid under the Treaty. Among these are restrictions on the price of the patented article, on standing to challenge the validity of the patent, on competition outside the market area covered by the Cartel Law, and on the use of improvements of the patented article and the grant back of improvement licenses. See Sander, Die emhache Patentgemehischaft int GWB, 9WuW 499, 500-04 (1959) . This approaches the problem of patent pools, which in Germany may fal within § 1 of the Cartel Law despite the legitimacy of most of their provisions under § 20. Cf " problems is not exported to Europe, businessmen should be aware of the likelihood that individual discriminatory pricing distinctions, unencumbered by producers' horizontal agreements, will fall within the scope of article 85. 30 It is equally clear that tie-in provisions are vulnerable to both private and administrative challenge. 31 The limitation to tie-in agreements covering goods or services that in fact or by commercial usage have no relation to the subject matter of the contract should not be narrowly construed. Recent discussions of this problem under German law indicate that this clause will not be considered a carte blanche for tie-in contracts, and this attitude may indicate that there is a more extensive prohibition than the face of the treaty implies.
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In general, then, it would appear that the number of practices that can under given circumstances constitute a violation of article 85 is at least as extensive as that which is vulnerable to attack under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nevertheless, the underlying differences between American and European economies and market practices are reflected in the exemptions created by article 85(3). This distinction is even more vividly articulated by the enforcement structure created for the policing of these exemptions-and thus of the whole competitive system; and even more to the point, by the underlying temper of this enforcement as illustrated in the few cases that have applied the exemption provision. gives it the assignment of promoting "constructive competition." Articles 43, 73-75. In pursuit of this assignment, the Commission recently promulgated Regulation 11, which will prohibit carriers from utilizing discriminatory freight rates based on country of origin or destination of the affected goods. For a discussion of the specific but partial applicability of articles 85-88 to transportation, see the Common Market will be a regulated virtue. 88 The exemption is so general that its interpretation is unpredictable. An otherwise null and void 4 practice may be approved if it promotes economic progress while reserving to the consumer an equitable share of the resulting profit, and neither is an unnecessary restriction nor eliminates competition in a substantial part of the relevant market. This is hardly a reliable guide for prediction. "Profit" is not used in a monetary sense, but as "advantage," 35 and other important words are equally ambiguous. Thus, even more than in the application of the Sherman Act, the Community antitrust law can only take form as the national cartel authorities, the national courts, the Court of Justice, and the Commission develop a body of case law.
To search for meaningful guides in the existing national precedents of Germany, the Netherlands and France is probably premature. Nevertheless, the treaty provisions will be enforced locally, and therefore the attitude of these courts and agencies as expressed in existing case law should prove enlightening. Even a brief review of the most recent decisions in these countries indicates that the enforcement of antitrust law will not do away with reasonable restraints deemed necessary to achieve more efficient production, precisely as is expressed in article 85(3)." As a matter of fact, 36. Even a summary review of national antitrust law on a functional basis would be impossible in a work of this scope. However, considering that emphasis in the member states is placed on the regulation of restrictive practices rather than on their formal prohibition, it may be worthwhile to mention a few especially common practices that have been the subject of scrutiny. A more comprehensive survey will be found in Riesenfeld, supra note 2.
France: The following practices have been the subject of prohibition or regulation: 1. Agreements between producers (mostly as part of cartel arrangements) to limit production; see Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agricoles A main, Recommendation of the Technical Commission for Ententes, 22 June 1957, Decision of the Minister of Economic Affairs, 9 Oct. 1958 , reprinted in Annex #1, Journal Officiel, 216, 4 June 1960 . In this case, which involved a complicated method of setting average prices and of relaying orders to individual producers on a quota basis, the Minister decided to suspend in part the application of the antitrust laws for two years. One reason for this decision was the expected competition within the Common Market from other member states' enterprises.
2. Agreements between producers to fix uniform prices or regulate price competition; see Entente dans l'industrie et le commerce de la levure de panification, Recommendation of the Technical Commission for Ententes, 24 Sept. 1955 21, 14 Jan. 1960 (no order of prohibition due to prior termination of the agreement by the parties).
The emphasis of the statute is on price fixing, whether horizontal or vertical, and the effects can be seen in the Commission's work. Van Frnkreich, 10 WuW 427 (1960) .
Germany: See generally Klaue, Zwei Jahre Rechtsprechung zurn Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen, 10 WuW 391 (1960), which discusses briefly over 100 cases, not including the activities of the Federal Cartel Office. The detailed enumeration of exceptions to the generally condemned restrictive practices in the German Cartel Law makes a summary of decisions less meaningful than in the case of France or the Netherlands.
Among specific practices that have been the subject of discussion are:
a study of the detailed German statutory sections pursuant to which the Cartel Office may register and allow restrictive practices necessary to nationalize an industry 3 7 and protect it during critical changes in the economy, 38 indicates that these national courts and agencies may at first do little more than publicize and moderate most concerted restrictive practicesA Dfisseldorf, 18 Dec. 1958 ("Betonteile") , in WuW/E LG/AG 127 (9 WuW 671 (1959)).
The Netherlands: The Minister of Economics has actively investigated restrictive practices, which began in 1946. These became especially intensive in 1956, when 243 price fixing arrangements were investigated, of which 115 were eliminated or modified. Investigations have been selective and no blanket prohibition has been imposed. The Minister shows particular leniency if open price competition would be ruinous to established firms. Even then, however, the prices set may be no higher than would be charged by the most efficient members of the particular competitive group.
1. The earliest cases, especially in 1946, condemned boycotts that had been used to force trade association members into specified exclusive dealing arrangements or to exclude new entrants from the market. See Decision of Jan. The first significant discussion of article 85 (3) is a decision of the German Cartel Office published in early 1959 in a case involving an application by a German licensee to register and approve a licensing agreement between it and its French licensor. 40 In granting an exclusive license under its patents for the production and sale of certain speed cutter machines in Germany, the licensor required:
(1) The licensee's promise not to produce or sell competing items until three years after termination of the agreement; (2) The licensee's agreement to grant back to the licensor its improvement inventions by taking out patents thereon in the licensor's name, reserving only the right to use the improvements; (3) The licensee's agreement to mark the particular goods conspicuously with the name and certain patent markings of the licensor.
On the insistence of the Cartel Office, the licensor agreed that the second provision would cover only improvement inventions and not independent parallel inventions. Upon further negotiation, the parties agreed to limit the prohibition of the manufacture or sale of competing goods to goods produced by the particular licensed method.
The Cartel Office found that these provisions were justified by the economic and technological investment of the licensor in its patented methods -the fruit of twenty years' activity in its particular field. The licensor would not have made them available to the licensee without the right to receive back exclusive rights to improvements subject to the licensee's right to use the same, and the right to forbid competition in this particular area for a limited number of years following the licensee's use of the patent. The Cartel Office held, therefore, that these facts justified granting an exemption under Section 20(3) of the German Cartel Law, and then proceeded to a discussion of the exemption provisions of Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty. It found that articles 85 and 86 were immediately applicable and that article 85(1) voided at least the second of the three contractual restraints. In justifying the application of article 85(3), it found that the requisites for application of the exemption were present. Economic justification was found in the marketing of a new product, advanced technological munity, 18 April 1951, arts. 60, 65, 67, 74 , the overriding need to protect existing levels of employment and national output has limited the scope of the High Authority's power in this area. See authorities cited supra; Rosen, The Brussels Entente Export Combination in the World Steel Market, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 .
It is also interesting to note that the jurisdictional criteria of article 65 are broader than those of article 85 of the Rome Treaty, being applicable whenever agreements tend directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict, or distort competition. progress, decreased prices, and improvements in quality, thus giving consumers sufficient "advantage"; in addition, the restrictions imposed in the license agreement did not restrain the licensee's freedom of action beyond that necessary to attain proper economic objectives, and because the licensee did not enjoy a dominant market position, did not exclude competition in a material part of the affected goods. 41 Admittedly, this one decision hardly constitutes an adequate basis for determining the German, much less any other, position on the escape clause. It does, however, offer some insight into the considerations that would be deemed important in its application. The analysis necessarily depends on a factual study of the market position of the parties, the competitive position of the particular machines involved compared with that of other machines intended for the same purpose, and the definitions of such catch phrases as "relevant market," "lines of commerce," and "scope of the patent monopoly." Nevertheless, a detailed factual analysis such as might be found in a United States district court decision is entirely lacking. Thus, the value of the case as a precedent for determining the validity of similar agreements is limited. What is important, however, is the unmistakable indication given by the German Cartel Office of the approach that will be used in weighing restrictive agreements in the future. 41. In Part II of the decision, the Cartel Office discussed the significance of the three restrictions in the light of § 20 of the German Cartel Law. Speaking of the grantback requirement, the Office agreed that the competition which had been established by means of the license agreement was in part restricted by the grantback license; however, this restriction was not so material as to result in a significant worsening of competitors' ability to supply the general public with goods produced according to the most recent technological advances. In discussing the prohibition on competition after termination of the license agreement, the Cartel Office gave considerable weight to the legitimate interest of the licensor in protecting its position.
42. An equally important, more recent decision applying article 85 (3) to an export syndicate is Decision of Federal Cartel Office ("Terrazzo"), 23 Aug. 1960, in WUW/E BKARTA 241 (10 WuW 805 (1960)). The Cartel Office there approved activities covering the Federal Republic and western Europe of a selling organization of three tile producers who produced about 10% of the German total. The agreement requires the members to do no independent selling, to turn over their entire production to the selling organization, to have no contact with purchasers, and to set uniform prices and discounts for their products in collaboration with the selling organization's management.
The Cartel Office investigated the nature and structure of the industry, its competition, and the particulars of its production and distribution system. Pursuant to section 5 of the Cartel Law, the Office justified the selling organization because of its "rationalizing" activities, which permit the individual producers to specialize and to avoid the inefficiencies of offering a full line of all products. In addition, since many orders require the full production of more than one company, the organization coordinates the placement of orders for most efficient production. Emphasis was also placed on the decreased selling and distributing costs of the single organization compared with individual sales divisions, and on the supervision of inventories by the central bureau. Even if these rationalizing functions did not clearly improve the product or lower prices, it was found that they at least improved the choice of available products and the ease and speed of purchase and delivery, thus satisfying the requirements of section 5 that the consumer benefit from the competitive restraints inherent in these activities. Finally, the Cartel Office determined that these rationalizing purposes could be effected only by such an organization, even though approximately 80 other producers were able to function competitively without such a grouping.
Finding the agreements prima facie violative of article 85 of the treaty, the Cartel [Vol. 61 : 402
B. Violations of Article 86 Through the Abuse of Monopolistic Power
In contrast to their concern with restrictive agreements, European commentators have generally ignored Article 86 of the Rome Treaty, which forbids abusive exploitation of "a dominant position within the Common Market" or a material part thereof by one or more enterprises, if the exploitation could detrimentally affect trade between member states. Particular instances of such exploitation, which are listed in article 86, are similar to the examples of unlawful agreements listed in article 85(1).
The obvious reason for this neglect is the underlying economic pattern in Europe. As is well known, basic industrial production is much more diffuse in Europe than in the United States. For example, while only ten firms account for eighty per cent of United States steel production, thirtyfive companies produce this percentage in the territory of the Community. Production of other industrial and durable consumer goods shows a similar market structure differential. In short, the European economy tends to be characterized by a large number of associated small producers; there are a few oligopolistic industries, but virtually no monopolies as the term is understood in the United States.
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This situation is reflected in article 86, which does not forbid monopolies but only their abuse." 4 While the list of abuses in article 86 undoubtedly is not exhaustive, they do include predatory practices that are entirely familiar to American attorneys. The practices deemed abusive in article 86 coincide with those listed in article 85 (1) and are in the main analogous to the prohibitions in Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act. However, no escape clause exists to justify these monopolistic practices, thus illustrating a legislative concern to maintain the European market structure concept and at the same time to prohibit unqualifiedly practices sometimes justifiable under article 85(3), when indulged in by enterprises enjoying a dominant market position. It has been argued that a dominant position "in" the Common Market
Office granted an exemption under article 85 (3) on the above grounds. The Cartel Office, interestingly enough, specified some of the gains to consumers: to Belgian consumers, the larger deliveries made possible by this syndicate meant a cheaper tariff rate; to Dutch consumers, a saving resulted from the use of cheaper water freights. Finally, the Cartel Office found that competition was not precluded in any substantial portion of the tile industry because other German producers, not to mention French, Italian, Swiss, Spanish, and Hungarian producers, were active in the member states. requires more than a dominant position in the market within one member state. 45 Thus, such a dominant position within each of several member states by several firms, none dominant in more than one country, may not be subject to attack under article 86 unless a nonexempt concerted activity is found. On the other hand, each member state is an integral part of the Common Market, and it can be argued that the abuse of a dominant position within one state is the proper concern of article 86 if trade between member states may thereby be affected. The meaning of "trade" is undoubtedly as broad as the concept "commerce" in the United States. 46 Trade between the member states, however, cannot at present be given the extended interpretation accorded "interstate commerce" in the United States law, because of the much less developed integration of commerce between the member states.
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Finally, as to the likelihood of anticompetitive effects, American practice under the Sherman and Clayton Acts will probably be valid precedent, since article 86 can reasonably be construed" to forbid abuses that have possible, not only actual, effects on trade.
One of the few national statutes resembling article 86 is Section 22 of the German Cartel Law, which attempts to define both a market-dominating entity, and the types of abuse of market position that can bring certain sanctions into play. Both provisions offer useful precedents. First of all, "market domination" and "share of the market" are not measured by the same yardstick ;49 a company enjoying ninety per cent of the market may find pricing and trading conditions set by energetic companies fighting to expand their ten per cent share. 50 Therefore, mere size, contrary to United
States practice, may not alone bring a company within the scope of article 86. Second, the "market" in which a company dominates must be established, not only by geographical criteria, but also by standards of "relevant market", measured by concepts of "elasticity of demand" and other criteria well known to United States law. In this connection, it may be noted that the du Pont Cellophane case 51 has had considerable influence on European commentators, who have in general praised its creation of a sophisticated methodology for dealing with this problem in a factual and elaborate manner, and for its definition of "relevant market". 52 Third, the German statute makes clear what is stated only generally in article 86-that a market dominating position attained whether contractually or otherwise by an oligopolistic group of concerns is within the scope of the ban on the abuse of a dominating position. 5 3 Thus, a variety of circumstances ranging from conscious parallelism to de facto domination due to tariff or quota situations can bring the sanctions of article 86 to bear on oligopolies as well as monopolies.
In other words, the preliminary questions to be determined before applying article 86 are by no means novel. Furthermore, German courts have, in this field, adopted the same extensive factual analysis that has been adopted by United States courts in this field. and constitutional issues have been raised by the imposition of the Rome Treaty on prior national legislation, and by the Treaty's relation to later enacted legislation. Some of these issues arise from directly conflicting provisions of law; others from the effect of certain discrepancies between the two systems. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the Community is not a genuine central political entity or structure to whose power and scope local sovereignties accommodate, but an attempted means of guiding specific activities on a voluntary federated basis.
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A. Date of Effectiveness and Present Binding Effect on Member States.
The first and most debated problem is the treaty's date of effectiveness. That date is left in considerable doubt by the wording of articles 85 and 87, a doubt that is compounded by the fact that many parts of this lengthy treaty will require varying lengths of time to come into effect. 57 The en- Dec. 12, 1960, p. 4; id. Dec. 13, 1960, p. 4; id. Dec. 14, 1960, p. 4; id. Dec. 15, 1960, p. 4; id. Dec. 16, 1960, p. 4; id. Dec. 19, 1960, p. 4. 58 (1 Jan. 1958 --17 Sept. 1958 ) 62-63 (1958 [Vol. 61 :402 towards resolving the problems raised, the Commission has worked with governmental experts of the member states and has determined that articles 85 and 86 are not simply declarations of principle. 6 4 Both views involve difficulties, since it is as troublesome to prescribe a method for implementing effective antitrust sanctions through varying national standards as it is to imagine the judging of individual cases by local courts or agencies in disregard of articles 85 and 86 . 6 The real problem lies in the unique nature of the whole experiment. Under such circumstances it is no wonder that European commentators and practitioners alike are in doubt as to the means of utilizing the Treaty's sanctions at this time. 6 National interests understandably play a role in the debate, for the existence of effective antitrust regulation in one country is apt to result in a demand for an immediately effective community-wide antitrust law, lest other member states' citizens be unfairly preferred by the absence of local anticompetitive controls.
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The Commission has, however, succeeded in having its position adopted at least in Germany, where the first important decision on this problem was rendered by the German Cartel Office in 1959. There it was held that the antitrust provisions of the treaty are presently binding law and must be considered by any court passing on the merits of any competitive restraint involved in an action. In the Netherlands, a temporary law has been enacted decreeing that these Treaty provisions shall have no binding effect unless the particular restraints involved also violate Dutch law. 7 1 Despite this attitude, however, there are strong indications that the Commission's position or a moderate variant of it will be adopted extensively during the interim period.
2 For all practical purposes, therefore, American corporations planning overseas activities will have to keep in mind articles 85 and 86 and the substantive law that is already growing around these provisions.
B. Enforcement Procedures and Scope of Review
Another major problem yet to be resolved is the relationship of actions before national courts or agencies to those brought within the Community's administrative and judicial enforcement structure.3 The treaty provides for the submission of all disputes arising under its provisions to the Court of Justice for final determination. 7 4 However, many proceedings relating to articles 85 and 86, whether administrative or judicial, will probably be brought in national forums. A national administrative agency may on its own motion position in providing in article 89 for certain specific investigations during the interim period by the Commission directly, which would have been unnecessary were these articles more than provisional statements. The court also avoided the applicability of article 177 of the treaty, which requires the submission of such issues to the Court of Justice, on the interesting but unsupported ground that this transfer requirement was not intended to apply to provisional remedies, in this case a temporary injunction. Cf. text accompanying note 84 infra.
This finding of validity conflicts directly with recent German decisions. Cf. Report, Sind Re-Importverbote suldissig, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 Dec. 1960, p. 9. The Federal Cartel Office, in the German action discussed in the report, has apparently urged that the case be submitted to the Court of Justice, under article 177 of the treaty, for a final determination.
71. Law of 5 Dec. 1957 , Staatsblad No. 528 (1957 . 72. In a decision of 14 July 1960 , reported in 10 WuW 691 (1960 , the Federal Cartel Office specifically declared that it based its approval of a licensing agreement between an Italian licensor and a German licensee on article 85(3), rendering inapplicable the otherwise relevant prohibition of article 85 (1) . See, e.g., Announcement of Federal Cartel Office Nr. 48/58, 24 Sept. 1958 , approving a license agreement between a German and an Italian company, "subject to the acceptability of these agreements pursuant to the EEC Treaty," reported in 9 WuW 41 (1959) ; Decision of Federal Cartel Office, 20 June 1960, in WuW/E BKARTA 254 (10 WuW 818 (1960)); Decision of the Appellate District 'Court Dusseldorf ("Sarotti" IV), 21 Oct. 1958 , in WuW/E OLG 262 (9 WuW 298 (1959 ), discussing the effect of article 85 on otherwise permissible price fixing provisions in the case of fair traded goods; Decision of District Court Frankfurt ("Uhrenarmbinder"), 13 Feb. 1959, in WuW/E LG/AG 137 (10 WuW 639 (1960?), discussing vertical pricing restrictions within the Common Market though diselaiming the need to examine this question of applicability.
73. The Community organization is to consist of an Assembly of 142 members, at present appointed by the national parliaments but eventually to be elected directly; a twelve-member Council made up of member states' representatives, which is to be the general decision-making body of the Community; and a full time nine-member Commission appointed with the common consent of the member governments but responsible to the Community as a whole, and charged with the actual administration of the treaty. See arts. 138, 146, 145, 157, 158, 155 [Vol. 61 : 402
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proceed against an enterprise that has initiated or continued forbidden restrictive practices, or that has failed to submit a restrictive practice for approval. 75 Second, an enterprise may proceed against a national cartel authority for failing to approve or condemning practices or agreements that the complainant alleges are legitimate. 76 Generally speaking, the appropriate proceeding would be an appeal to the local court empowered by statute to hear such cases. Third, an antitrust problem may be involved in a civil action between private parties before a local court, either as a matter of complaint or defense. 7 7 The local appellate procedures in all such "normal" situations are a matter of local statute. 7 8 The proceedings that may be brought directly before the Commission of Duisseldorf, 21 Oct. 1958 , in WuW/E OLG 262 (9 WuW 298 (1959 ), in which the defendant, whom plaintiff sought to enjoin from selling chocolate below fair traded prices, used article 85 in an unsuccessful challenge to the validity of plaintiff's registered fair trading price schedule. violation, if one is found to exist; in the event of noncompliance it may render a decision concerning such violations and empower the member states to take appropriate measures against the condemned practices. 80 This power was recently exercised for the first time, when on the request of a member of the European Parliament, an investigative proceeding was instituted in connection with an agreement reached by two Belgian associations with various producers. The agreement allegedly caused competitive injury to nonconsenting Italian producers, and in a preliminary hearing the Commission announced that the practices presumably violate article 85 (1) .81
An additional and important role yet to be defined is that of the Court of Justice. Articles 173 and 177 of the Rome Treaty indicate which parties may come before that court and the proceedings which it may hear. EWG, 10 WuW 313, 325 (1960) . 81. Amtsblatt der Europiischen Gemeinschaften 1122 (Oct. 31, 1959 , discussed in 10 WuW 47 (1960) . See also the report that the Commission intervened with the French government to obtain the cessation of discriminatory treatment of foreign machine tool manufacturers in Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 5, 1959, p. 7. 82. For a detailed discussion of possible legal proceedings before 84. This procedure may eventually produce a substantive Community law, but is obviously being approached with caution. To the knowledge of the author, no case has yet been presented to the Court of Justice under this article. An interesting discussion on this point may be found in the Sarotti case, WuW/E OLG 262 (9 WuW 298 (1959)). At issue was the present legal effect of article 85. In addition to the issue being irrelevant because article 85 could not in any event apply-the price fixing provisions of the disputed contract were applicable only within Germany-the court on other grounds considered itself precluded from determining the issue:
The question .. 89. CARTEL LAW § 73. Apart from a group of formal defects found in lower court proceedings, -listed in § 73(4), on whose existence appeal as of right may be grounded, an appeal is to be considered if (a) a question of law of fundamental significance or (b) when the development of the law or the guarantee of a uniform legal interpretation requires a decision. Section 73(2). The appellate district court in the first instance decides if these criteria are satisfied, § 73(3); however, an appeal from this court's refusal to grant leave is possible, § 74.
90. The general treaty directive is found in article 3(h), which provides that to carry out its general purposes, the activities of the Community shall include: "the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning ministrative bodies will to a considerable extent be used to administer the treaty's antitrust provisions, any transfer requirements that the Council may attempt to enact by regulation will have to be grafted onto national systems that are diverse and in some instances will conflict with the requirements. 
C. Conflicts with National Procedural and Substantive Provisions
Another procedural problem of importance is the constitutional relationship between the treaty and national legislation. To a still unknown extent, new enactments will probably be needed in each member state to implement the antitrust provisions of the treaty. 92 It is by no means clear that the treaty is self-executing, at least in countries that have no antitrust legislation. The implied directive of the treaty, that laws consistent with its purposes be enacted, 93 is therefore of concern to most of these countries.
The effect of a later enacted, inconsistent statute must also be considered. For example, Italy is yet without antitrust legislation, although some enactment is expected. In Italy, as in Germany, treaties and statutes are of equal rank, with the later in time governing in case of conflict. 4 May their respective cartel authorities therefore approve arrangements that harm other Community markets on the ground that the later enactment of a more permissive statute indicates an intent to repeal or ignore inconsistent provisions of the earlier treaty? The frequency with which applications for the approval of export cartels or other restrictive combinations have been made before the German Cartel Office indicates that the problem is a real one. In those countries which possess legislation on understandings, regulations on this point are generally adequate. In Belgium on the other hand, as well as in Italy and Luxembourg, appropriate provisions are lacking. Since all that is required is to designate the competent authorities and determine the procedure to be followed and the sanctions necessary to ensure respect for decisions, it should be possible to promulgate these provisions in a relatively short time. SECOND REPORT 80-81.
For a discussion of the practical importance or lack thereof of this harmonization [Vol. 61 : 402
The same treaty-statute conflicts that may be expected in the procedural area may also become important in some fields of substantive law. The main present area of conflict is the status of national export cartels or agreements. Under Section 6 of the German Cartel Law, for example, an exemption from the prohibition of section 1 may be granted to agreements concerning exports, so long as they regulate competition only in markets outside Germany.
1°1 Quite clearly such an agreement might concern exports to and the market within a member state and thus directly run afoul of article 85, although specifically authorized under the terms of the German Cartel Law. 10 2 More important, even if such an agreement regulates only an overseas market, it might indirectly affect trade between the member states in violation of article 85.103 Certain practices, for example, price fixing of the exported product for the foreign retail market, may not even come within the scope of section 6 of the Cartel Law, 10 4 and may, therefore, not be subject to regulation by the Federal Cartel Office. In this situation, the Cartel Office, although unable to apply the sanctions of the German statute, should in all probability deny approval to such arrangements, relying directly on article
85.105
A similar problem is caused by Section 16 of the German Cartel Law, which exempts fair-traded goods from the prohibition against retail price fixing contained in section 15. There is no such exemption in article 85.100 Thus, to the extent that fair-traded goods are sold in more than one member state, price fixing agreements affecting competitive trade between member states could violate article 85. Again, the wording of section 16 leaves the way open for the Cartel Office to apply article 85 directly since section 16 merely exempts these agreements from section 15.107 the possibility of de facto conflict even in the absence of conflicting statutes.
If this practice is not excepted from the prohibition against price fixing found in article 85 of the treaty, then the importing of such goods into a member state whose law permits fair trading, for sale to retailers or even the public at less than the fair-traded price, can not be prevented. As a result, the statutory scheme of fair trading is breached, since the imports would vitiate any effort at airtight enforcement of fair-traded prices.' 08 With the expected increasing integration of trade between the member states, such problems will arise more and more frequently.
Ill. CONCLUSION
American industry dealing with or in the Community market faces some very important and practical problems, since American as well as other companies will come within the scope of these general provisions of the treaty and the forthcoming regulations, which are or soon will be binding law. No structure or authority is, however, created by the treaty to test specific agreements or transactions. The Commission is not a cartel authority, and despite the extension of its jurisdiction and powers foreseen by the proposed regulations implementing articles 85 and 86, it probably will not possess the full powers of a typical national agency. There is no present supranational office or authority that is responsible in the first instance for giving approval or advice, notwithstanding the general supervision over substantive law that the Court of Justice may attain. Instead, for some time to come the application of articles 85 and 86 will be primarily the responsibility of national courts or agencies.
10 9 In addition to the importance of local law in resolving a myriad 108. Cf. Decision of Appellate District Court Dfisseldorf ("Sarotti" IV), 21 Oct. 1958 , in WuW/E OLG 262 (9 WuW 298 (1959 1, 8 (3 July 1957) . An attempt to weigh the relative role of national authorities and the Community Authorities in procedural and substantive areas was made recently by Verloren van Themaat, Director General of the Commission's Department on Competition.
The last problem to which I would like to refer, but which I do not propose to examine in detail, is that of the implementing rules pursuant to Article 87. The ruling on competence and procedure in Article 88, according to which the national authorities are competent and the national procedures and penalties applicable for the time being, is only an interim one. The final division of competence between Court of Justice, Commission and national authorities, as well as the definitive procedure and penalties are to be laid down in an implementing ordinance pursuant to Article 87. There will therefore be gradual alteration, not only in the content of the substantive law applicable, but also in that of rules on procedure and penalties.
At the moment the substantive law of the six States is still more important than the substantive law of the Treaty, because most of the restrictive agreements are still of a purely national scope. As regards agreements coming under the Treaty of Rome, this law may be applied along with the rules of the Treaty to the extent that it is compatible with these rules. As regards procedure and sanctions, national legislation at the moment is the main source of law. In the first place, because of the regulatory force of economic facts, the role of the antitrust legislation of Member States will gradually decline, even though its of peripheral problems, including the effect of articles 85 and 86 on private contractual litigation, it will for the present determine what applications for approval should be made and to whom. At the same time, if the regulations now proposed are enacted, it is expected that the Commission will in part supersede these national agencies and their procedures in passing on agreements and practices falling within the scope of the treaty.
American companies will thus have to be alert to determine both whether proposed business ventures in Europe will violate national or Community antitrust laws and how and when such plans must be made known to or approved by these respective cartel agencies. Once various agreements and practices have been adopted, these firms must keep in mind the possible role of treaty law and treaty organizations in judicial or administrative contests concerning these agreements or practices. As regards both procedure and substance, the guideposts available to the American attorney will not long remain vague. The complex and highly developed state of the industrial and commercial life into which the Rome Treaty was thrust demands and assures the rapid evolution of a comparably refined body of antitrust law, although it will be applied, except for private disputes, primarily through administrative procedures. The American attorney, within previously described limits, can draw considerable guidance during this period from extensive American antitrust experience, even though he should be careful to adapt this knowledge to the different bases of economic activity in the Common Market.
